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Sex Discrimination in the Workplace Across
the Atlantic: A Comparison of Burdens of
Proof in the United States and the United
Kingdom
Jason E. Ruff*
I. Introduction
Litigation concerning sex discrimination in the workplace makes up
an ever-expanding amount of work for lawyers and courts in the United
States.1  Recent changes to sex discrimination law in the United
Kingdom (U.K.) in the form of plaintiff-friendly regulations enacted in
20012 have set off alarm bells for employers in that country as well. Due
to the heightened risk of litigation, this is an area of law where employers
must tread carefully. Because defendants in both countries bear a
significant burden in rebutting plaintiffs' claims, being unaware of the
nuances of that burden can lead to a plaintiffs verdict. This would
especially be so should the plaintiff-friendly standards evolving in
Europe cross the Atlantic.
This Comment focuses on the burdens of production and persuasion
that parties have in certain types of sex-based employment
discrimination claims in the U.S. and the U.K., and analyzes recent
changes in the law. The trend, first in continental Europe with European
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A., English, Ithaca College, 1990.
1. Approximately 25,000 complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of sex
under Title VII have been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
each year from 1993 through 2004. EEOC Sex-Based Charges Statistics,
http://eeoc.gov/stats/sex.html. In the 1990s, the number of employment discrimination
cases sharply increased, with the number of filings in the U.S. District Courts nearly
tripling between 1990 and 1998, from 8,143 to 23,735. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/crcusdc.pr.
The growth largely was driven by cases between private parties, which rose from nearly
7,000 cases to more than 21,000 in 1998. Id.
2. Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations
2001, S.I. 2001/2660.
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Union directives and later in the U.K. with the 2001 Regulations, is
toward more plaintiff-friendly standards in employment litigation.
Although the trend is not as pronounced in the U.S., it arguably exists.
Part II of the Comment looks at the statutory bases for
discrimination laws in the U.S. and the U.K., beginning with the Equal
Pay Acts in both countries and then focusing on the primary sex
discrimination legislation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the
U.S. and the Sex Discrimination Act in the U.K. Part III focuses on how
courts in the U.S. and the U.K. have implemented their respective Equal
Pay Acts. Part IV takes a detailed look at Title VII and the Sex
Discrimination Act, particularly the employers' burdens of proof under
each statute that must be satisfied to avoid judgment for the plaintiff.
The requirement in the U.S. that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion in Title VII disparate treatment cases and the 2001
Regulations in the U.K. codifying the common law trend towards
increasing employers' burden are contrasted because they best
demonstrate how differences in the U.S. and U.K. burdens of production
and persuasion result in a relatively employer-friendly system in the U.S.
and a more employee-friendly one in the U.K.
II. Statutory Bases for Laws Against Employment Discrimination
Based on Sex
A. Development in the U.S.
Prior to the enactment of legislation prohibiting sex discrimination
in the employment context, courts in the U.S. and the U.K. were often
hostile to the rights of women in the workplace. In the U.S., this was
epitomized by the Supreme Court's decision in Muller v. Oregon,3 where
the Court held that although the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects men's unlimited freedom to contract with
employers, it does not provide the same protection for women. Basing
its decision on "abundant testimony of the medical fraternity," the Court
reasoned that because of women's "special physical organization"
leading to their "disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence," long hours
of labor are dangerous for women as individuals.4 Further, because of
the importance of women to "the rearing and education of children[,] the
maintenance of the home" and their "maternal functions[,]" the Court felt
that restrictions on women's freedom of contracting is "not solely
imposed for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all," for the
3. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
4. Id. at 421.
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public has an interest in preserving the "strength and vigor of the race"
by limiting how long women can work.5 Therefore, the Court concluded
that Oregon's law limiting women's work hours was constitutional.6
Against such a backdrop, and as attitudes towards women in the
workplace evolved, U.S. legislation addressing employment
discrimination based on sex originated in the 1960s. The U.S. Equal Pay
Act was passed in 1963,7 soon followed by the ground-breaking Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 8 Title VII was originally
designed to combat discrimination in employment on the basis of race
and was not originally contemplated to be aimed intentionally at sex
discrimination. 9 In fact, the language concerning sex discrimination was
inserted by lawmakers opposed to civil rights legislation in an attempt to
defeat the bill by making it less palatable to their colleagues, but the
drafters failed in their goal.10 Despite the convoluted and controversial
legislative history, Title VII now covers employment discrimination
based not only on sex and race but based also on color, religion, and
national origin.'1
B. Development in the U.K.
Much of the current U.K. statutory language concerning
employment discrimination based on sex was inspired by Title VII in the
U.S.' 2  Thus, the growth of U.K. sex discrimination legislation has
5. Id. at 421-22.
6. Id. at 423.
7. "No employer.., shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages.., at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions[.]"
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006). The Equal Pay Act is currently incorporated into the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2005), the basic U.S. statutory
scheme regulating wages and hours at the federal level.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (citing C.
& B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
115-17 (1985)) (observing the "bizarre path by which 'sex' came to be included as a
forbidden criterion for employment" under Title VII).
10. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243 n.9.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
12. See, e.g., Mary Redmond, Women and Minorities, in LABOUR LAW IN BRITAIN
476 (Roy Lewis ed., 1986). Additionally, because of the closely related statutory bases
for sex and race discrimination in the U.S. and the U.K., sex and race cases are used
interchangeably by the courts of both countries to illustrate and support the larger
principles of anti-discrimination laws generally. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (clarifying that principles articulated by the Supreme Court, and
legislators' statements in Title VII's legislative history, referring to one type of
employment discrimination apply with "equal force" to other types); see also Ashley
Norman, Sex, lies and employment tribunals..., NEW LAW JOURNAL, April 5, 2002
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paralleled that in the U.S. 13 Prior to action by Parliament, British courts
had not developed common-law prohibitions against gender
discrimination, and as in the U.S., case law was often hostile to women's
rights. 14 Also similar to the U.S., principles and statutory language in
U.K. legislation addressing sex discrimination mirrors that for race
discrimination. 15 In many cases the legislation evolved into its current
form as European law and directives were instituted in the U.K. 16 Today
the two major pieces of U.K. legislation addressing sex-based
employment discrimination are the Equal Pay Act of 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975. British courts have long regarded these two
acts together as creating a single statutory scheme prohibiting
discrimination based on sex.
17
The U.K. Equal Pay Act was originally enacted in 1970, providing
equal pay for equal work.' 8 However, much of the Act did not come into
(discussing developments in U.K. civil rights law and noting that "[o]ne of the most
important sex discrimination cases in recent months is not a sex discrimination case at all.
This important race case has broad applications across discrimination law generally.").
Therefore, even though the focus of this comment is on gender discrimination, cases
involving race discrimination are relevant and also discussed.
13. See Redmond, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578 (H.L.), holding it to be unlawful
for local governments to provide for equal pay for both men and women.
15. Unlike Title VII in the U.S. which includes prohibitions against discrimination
based both on sex and race within the same statutory scheme, the comparable legislation
in the U.K. separates the two into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) and the Race
Relations Act 1976 (RRA). However, the SDA and the RRA are very similar and the
language is largely identical in crucial areas. Compare SDA § 1(1) ("A person
discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any
provision of this Act if on the grounds of her sex he treats her less favourably than he
treats or would treat a man[.]") with RRA § 1(1) ("A person discriminates against another
in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if on racial
grounds he treats that other less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons; or
he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply
equally to persons not of the same racial group as that other[.]"). In fact, the SDA was
used as a model for the RRA. See, e.g., Bob Hepple & Sandra Freeman, Discrimination,
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
332-33 (R. Blampain ed., 1992).
16. The European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, requires European Community law
to be adopted in the U.K. For a discussion of the interrelation of European and U.K. law
concerning sex discrimination and the obligation of the U.K. to ensure its laws are
consistent with those of the European Community, see Lord Denning's opinion in Shields
v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., [1978] W.L.R. 1408.
17. Redmond, supra note 11, at 479. See also Steel v. Union of Post Office
Workers, [1977] W.L.R. 64 ("[I]t is necessary as far as possible to construe the 1975 [Sex
Discrimination] Act with the 1970 [Equal Pay] Act so as to form a harmonious code.");
Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., [1979] W.L.R. 1408 (Lord Denning) (noting that
European Community law concerning sex discrimination, the Equal Pay Act, and the
SDA "must all be taken together[,]" but acknowledging that "the task of construing them
is like fitting together a jig-saw puzzle. The pieces are all jumbled together[.]").
18. The Long Title of the Act explains its purpose: "[T]o prevent discrimination, as
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force until the 1975 implementation of Article 119 (now Article 141) of
the Treaty of Rome and the European Equal Pay Directive, both of which
are major European Community equal rights legislation with which all
member states must comply.' 9 A major revision to the Act occurred in
1983, when it was broadened to include equal pay protections for women
doing work of "equal value" to men, even if the actual job title differs.2 °
The U.K. Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) was originally enacted in
1975, but it did not come into force until the U.K. implemented the
European Equal Treatment Directive in 1976.21 In 2001, the SDA
changed significantly when the Sex Discrimination (Indirect
Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations (2001 Regulations)
were enacted." The 2001 Regulations implemented the European
Union's Burden of Proof Directive,2 3 and had two components: they
articulated higher burden for an employer defending itself against sex
discrimination claims, and they changed the definition of indirect
discrimination.2 4 Both pose potential problems for employers and are
discussed in detail below.
regards terms and conditions of employment between men and women." Equal Pay Act
1970.
19. E.C. Directive 75/117 (1975).
20. Equal Pay Act (Amendment) Regulations 1983, S.I. 1983/1794. This
amendment and the "equal value" concept arose as a result of efforts by the Commission
of the European Communities to compel the U.K. to fully implement the Treaty of Rome,
which included such protections. See Comm'n of the European Cmtys. v. United
Kingdom, [1982] I.C.R. 578. This is another area where plaintiffs in the U.K. have an
easier time alleging sex discrimination compared to those in the U.S., where the similar
"comparable worth" theory is rarely recognized. This theory permits plaintiffs to claim
"increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty
of their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community[,]" County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981), even if the jobs being compared are
dissimilar, for example, comparing the pay of a secretarial job held by a woman and a
janitorial job held by a man. Unfortunately for U.S. plaintiffs, this theory is not
recognized under the Equal Pay Act and only rarely is recognized under Title VII. See
generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 579-82 (6th ed. 2003).
21. E.C. Directive 76/207 (1976).
22. S.I. 2001/2660.
23. E.C. Directive 97/80 (1997) (establishing the standard within the European
Community that once an employee presents "facts from which it may be presumed that
there has been direct or indirect [sex] discrimination, it shall be for the [employer] to
prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment").
24. S.I. 2001/2660.
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III. Equal Pay Acts
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case under the Equal Pay Acts
The Equal Pay Acts in both the U.S. and the U.K. predate Title VII
and the SDA in their respective countries.2 5 Under the U.S. Equal Pay
Act, an individual plaintiff must show that her or his employer pays
different rates of pay to employees of the opposite sex for performing
jobs that are substantially equal.26 Similarly, the U.K. Equal Pay Act
covers doing the same or "broadly similar" work as men,27 or work that
has been "rated as equivalent with that of [men]. 28 A prima facie case is
established by a gender-based comparison showing that a woman who
does such "like work" as a man is paid or treated less favorably than the
man.29 This variation is presumed to be due to the difference of sex, and
creates a rebuttable presumption for the employer to counter.3° As will
be explored, after the plaintiff successfully articulates a prima facie case,
both Equal Pay Acts shift the burden to the employer by requiring the
employer to assert affirmative defenses.
B. Employer Defense Burdens under the Equal Pay Acts
1. U.S. Employer Defenses.
Once a plaintiff makes out her prima facie case in a U.S. Equal Pay
Act claim, the defendant's burden is fairly straightforward: to escape
liability, the employer must show one of the four specific statutorily
defined affirmative defenses. 31  The statutory defenses were illustrated
25. See infra Part II.
26. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). The
Corning Glass Court noted that "[a]lthough the Act is silent on this point, its legislative
history makes plain that the [plaintiff] has the burden of proof on this issue." Id.
27. Equal Pay Act § 1(4).
28. Equal Pay Act § 1(5). This is actually a formal evaluation that can be
undertaken to rate the "worth" of the work a woman is doing compared do what a man is
doing even though the actual job title, description, and primary tasks may not be
identical. The Act stipulates that such things as effort, skill, and decision making are to
be compared in the evaluation, and if they are found to be equivalent, the woman should
receive the same pay as the man in the same "undertaking." Id.
29. Nelson v. Carillion Services Ltd., [2003] I.C.R. 1256.
30. Id.
31. Under the U.S. Equal Pay Act, an employer may pay different rates for equal or
similar work:
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation
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by the Supreme Court in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,32 where a
group of female day shift inspectors was being paid a lower base wage
than male inspectors doing the same work on the night shift.33 The
Secretary of Labor argued that under the Equal Pay Act, although higher
wages may be paid for night shift work without violating the Act, such a
pay differential must be based on a factor "other than sex." 34 Here, the
Secretary argued, the employer failed to carry its burden of proof by
showing that the higher base wage for male night inspectors was, in fact,
based on any factor other than sex.35 Although the Court noted that the
pay differential arose before the Equal Pay Act came into force and
characterized the employer's actions as "understandable as a matter of
economics" because of a job market where men would not work at a
lower wage, the Court agreed with the Secretary and held that the pay
difference nevertheless became illegal once the Equal Pay Act was
born.36 The Court reasoned that the employer was taking advantage of
of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this
subsection, reduce the wages of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006). These statutory justifications for pay differences based on
sex were originally not available under Title VII. An employer could therefore be in
compliance with the Equal Pay Act but still run the risk of violating Title VII if a pay
difference was a result of one of the above four factors. Congress reconciled the Equal
Pay Act defenses with Title VII with the addition of § 703(h) to Title VII. The so-called
Bennett Amendment harmonized the two statutory schemes by stating that an employer
does not violate Title VII if wage differentials based on sex are "authorized" by the Equal
Pay Act (that is, the difference is a result of one of the four reasons permitted by Equal
Pay Act). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
32. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
33. Id. at 190. Certiorari in Corning Glass was granted under interesting
circumstances. The Court consolidated two cases with basically identical facts, see infra
note 31, and involving the same employer, but at different work locations less than forty
miles apart in different states. Id. at 190-91. In a New York case, the Second Circuit
held that the wage difference violated the Equal Pay Act. See Hodgson v. Coming Glass
Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973). However, in a Pennsylvania case, the Third Circuit
found no violation. See Brennan v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1973).
The Court granted certiorari to resolve this "unusually direct" conflict between the
circuits. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 191. The Court ultimately agreed with the Second
Circuit and reversed the Third. Id. The wage difference developed because of pre-Equal
Pay Act state laws prohibiting women from working at night. Id. at 191. When the plant
began a night shift, the employer therefore had to recruit men to do same work at night
that the women were doing during the day. Id. The male employees who transferred to
the night shift "demanded and received" higher wages than the women doing the same
work during the day. Id.
34. Id. at 197.
35. Id. The Court found evidence in the record that the employer felt additional
compensation was warranted because the men viewed inspection jobs as demeaning and
as "women's work." Id. at 192 n.3.
36. Id. at 205. The Court quoted the Second Circuit, noting that the Equal Pay Act
was enacted in part as a recognition of "the weaker bargaining position of many women"
and the belief that "discrimination in wage rates represented unfair employer exploitation
of this cheap source of labor." Id. at 206.
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the availability of female labor, and the difference in wage rates arose
only because of the sex of the workers.37
Despite the broadly worded "any factor other than sex" defense
available to employers, courts put a high burden of persuasion on
employers to discharge their statutory defenses. In Stanziale v.
Jargowsky,3 8 for example, an older male working as a sanitary inspector
sued when a younger female was hired for the same position and was
paid more.39  The Third Circuit articulated a high standard for the
employer when it attempted to assert one of the statutory defenses. To
successfully argue summary judgment, the court required the employer
to submit evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude
"not merely that the employer's proffered reasons could explain the wage
disparity, but that the proffered reasons do in fact explain the wage
disparity. ' 4° In Stanziale, the employer explained the wage difference by
pointing to the female's undisputed superior education and training
levels.4 1  However, the record lacked evidence to prove that the pay
difference was so clearly attributed to the differences in education and
training that no rational jury could find that the differences were due to
the employees' sex.42 Because the defendant bears the burden at trial to
clearly show one of the four statutory defenses, and because here the
employer did not carry that burden, the court of appeals reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer on the Equal
Pay Act claim.43
Similarly, a court placed a heavy burden on the employer to
establish one of the four Equal Pay Act defenses in Ryduchowski v. The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.44 There, a jury found that
the employer failed to establish the valid merit system affirmative
defense for the pay disparity between a female employee and a similarly
situated male.45 The district court concluded, however, that the employer
had met its burden, and granted the employer judgment as a matter of
37. Id. at 208.
38. 200 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2000).
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 108.
42. Id. at 107, quoting E.E.O.C. v. Delaware Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 865
F.2d 1408, 1414 (3d Cir. 1989).
43. Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 108. However, summary judgment for the employer on a
Title VII claim in this case was affirmed because the employee did not present sufficient
evidence for a factfinder to reasonably conclude that the younger female's superior
qualifications were so unrelated to her employment so as to be a pretext for intentional
discrimination. Id. at 107.
44. 203 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2000).
45. Id. at 137.
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law.46 On appeal, the Second Circuit characterized the employer's
burden in asserting the Act's affirmative defenses as "a heavy one"
because statutory exemptions are "narrowly construed., 47 Considering
this high burden, the ample evidence to support the verdict at trial, and
the amount of deference that should be afforded juries' findings of fact
generally, the court reinstated the jury verdict.48
2. U.K. Employer Defenses.
After a plaintiff has made out her prima facie case under the U.K.
Equal Pay Act, British employers have a statutory defense under the Act,
the "material factor defense. 4 9 Under this defense, a variation between a
man's and a woman's compensation is justifiable if the employer proves
first that the variation is "genuinely due to a material factor which is not
the difference of sex," and second that the factor is "a material difference
between the woman's case and the man' s.,,
50
The material factor defense was challenged in Jenkins v. Kingsgate
(Clothing Productions) Ltd. 51 where an employer paid part-time workers
ten percent less per hour than full-time workers performing the same
work. All but one of the part-time workers was female, and one of them
challenged the pay difference on Equal Pay Act grounds, contending that
the Act required equal pay in every case where a woman performs "like
52
work" to men. The employer asserted the material factor defense,
arguing that the difference was not based on the characteristics of the
worker or the quality of the work, but rather that it was motivated by the
need to discourage absenteeism, to ensure that expensive machinery was
being used to its fullest extent, and to encourage greater productivity.53
The industrial tribunal agreed, finding that the difference in work hours
constituted a "material difference, other than the difference of sex," to
justify the pay differential. 54
46. Id. at 141.
47. Id. at 143.
48. Id. at 145.
49. Equal Pay Act 1970, c. 41, § 1(3).
50. Id.
51. [1981] W.L.R. 927.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Although the employment appeal tribunal agreed that there was no Equal Pay
Act claim here, the plaintiff appealed, and the EAT referred the question to the European
Court of Justice to see if the lower part-time pay rate ran afoul of Article 119 of the EEC
Treaty or of the European Community's Equal Pay Directive. The European Court of
Justice clarified that a lower part-time pay rate does not necessarily amount to illegal sex
discrimination, provided that the hourly rates are applied to workers belonging to either
category without distinction based on sex, or unless it is in reality merely an indirect way
of reducing the level of pay of part-time workers on the grounds that the group of
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
The House of Lords later clarified that under the material factors
defense, an employer must satisfy an employment tribunal on several
matters.55 The employer must demonstrate that the explanation given for
the pay disparity is genuine and not a "sham or pretence" (echoing Title
VII and SDA principles discussed in Part IV, infra), that the reason is
due to a material, significant and relevant factor, and that the reason is
not "the difference of sex.",56 If the employer can discharge its burden,
there is no need to prove a "good" reason for the pay disparity; the
employer must only show that the disparity is not due to the difference of
sex.57  Conversely, however, the mere absence of actual sex
discrimination or an historical reason for the pay disparity is not enough
to discharge the burden. 58 Rather, there must be an actual reason for the
disparity that is completely unrelated to sex.59
IV. Title VII and the Sex Discrimination Act
Title VII in the U.S. and the SDA in the U.K. provide employment
discrimination protections beyond the differences in pay that the Equal
Pay Acts prohibit. They address subtler forms of discrimination and
prohibit most employment decisions from being based on the sex of an
employee. As will be explored, Title VII and the SDA are similar in
their statutory objectives and share common threads in their judicial
interpretation. However, recently the U.S. and the U.K. have been
drifting apart on the issue of the parties' burdens of proof under these
statutory schemes. Both Title VII and the SDA use similar concepts,
although different terms, to address the impact that discriminatory acts or
policies have on individuals or groups. One concept is called "disparate
treatment" in the U.S. and is analogous to "direct discrimination" in the
U.K.; the other is "disparate impact" in the U.S. and the roughly
equivalent "indirect discrimination" in the U.K.6 °
workers is composed mainly of women. Id.
55. Glasgow City Council v. Marshall, [2000] W.L.R. 333.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The British and American terms are not completely interchangeable, as
differences do exist. However, they are close enough to illustrate the themes discussed in
this Comment.
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A. Disparate Treatment and Direct Discrimination
1. The Prima Facie Case.
The prohibition of disparate treatment and direct discrimination
means that employers in the U.S. cannot legally discriminate "because
of... sex,, 61 and employers in the U.K. cannot legally treat a woman
"less favourably" than a man.
62
"Disparate treatment" is the practice of intentionally dealing with
persons differently because of certain characteristics such as sex and
race. 63 An indispensable element of a disparate impact case is intent: the
employer must have intentionally discriminated against the employee,
and the protected trait must have actually motivated the employer's
decision to take the action that it did.64 Because it is difficult to prove by
direct, objective evidence that these often subjective decisions were
based on sex, a plaintiff is not required to submit direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.6 5  Instead, a rather complex scheme has evolved
61. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2006).
62. "A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the
purposes of any provision of this Act if on the grounds of her sex he treats her less
favourably than he treats or would treat a man." SDA § l(1)(a). Although much of the
SDA refers specifically to "women" being treated less favorably than "men," § 2 of the
SDA explicitly states that the Act is to be read "as applying equally to the treatment of
men, and for that purpose shall have the effect with such modifications as are requisite."
Similarly, men and whites are protected under the sex and race language of Title VII.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (7th ed. 1999).
64. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
65. Both British and U.S. courts recognize the challenge of showing discrimination
by direct evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that proving an employer's
actual intent is often an impossible task. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983). Because eyewitness testimony to the employer's
mental processes is rare, proving actual intent would be an unfair burden on the plaintiff.
Id. However, the Court acknowledges that attempting to determine intent (through, i.e.,
inferences) is not an undue burden to place upon a court: "The law often obliges finders
of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. . . . 'The state of a man's mind is as much
a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state
of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as
anything else."' Id., citing Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (Eng. 1885).
Therefore, if it is not possible for a plaintiff to show direct evidence of discriminatory
motive, it is permissible for the factfinder to infer it from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). See also Barton v. Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Secs. Ltd., [2003] I.C.R.
1205 at 25(3)-(4).(EAT) (discussion by a British employment tribunal noting that
because it is "unusual" to find direct evidence of sex discrimination, it is proper for a
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for the parties to make their cases successfully in the absence of direct
evidence.66 Under this scheme, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
show the employer's intent or motivation to discriminate.67
In general, a plaintiff alleging an individual disparate treatment
claim under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence must establish a
prima facie case by showing that she is covered by the statute, there was
a vacant position, she applied for that position, she was qualified, she
was denied the position, and the position subsequently remained open to
be filled by someone else. 68 However, these elements are not rigid, and
the Supreme Court has elaborated that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary
in Title VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof
required... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations. '69  However, the plaintiff must show that the
employment decision was made under circumstances "which give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination., 70 A plaintiffs burden of proof
at the prima facie stage is "easily met." 71 Satisfying this burden raises an
inference of discrimination and creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee, a presumption the
tribunal to "depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found
by the tribunal").
66. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 802.
69. Id. at 802 n. 13. As a later decision noted:
The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of the
elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general principle
that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence
adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a
discriminatory criterion illegal under [Title VII].
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
70. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). See also
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1990),
rev 'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992) ("A plaintiff in a sex discrimination
case can establish a prima facie showing of promotion discrimination by demonstrating
that she is a member of the protected class, that she was qualified for the position, that
she was not promoted into a job for which she was qualified, and that the position was
given to a male.").
71. Ezold, 751 F. Supp. at 1191. More recently, a state supreme court, applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to a state anti-discrimination law and focusing on the
"qualified" prong of a prima facie case, held that the plaintiff satisfied his prima facie
burden when he showed simply that he was performing his job prior to the termination.
In Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 867 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 2005), the court rejected the
employer's claim that the plaintiff failed his prima facie burden because he was not
"qualified for the position" since he had failed to meet sales targets and so was not
performing at his employer's expectations. Id. at 1137-38. The court rejected that
argument, emphasizing that at this stage the plaintiffs burden "is not a heavy [one] nor
was it meant to be[,]" and as long as the plaintiff "adduces evidence that he has, in fact,
performed the position up to the time of termination, the slight burden" of showing that
he is qualified has been established. Id. at 1144.
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employer has the burden of rebutting.72
The nature of "intent" under the U.K. concept of direct
discrimination is slightly different. There, the objective result, rather
than inferring the employer's subjective intent, is the foCUS.7 3 If a woman
is treated differently than a man for any reason (and vice versa), even for
a benign reason, there is direct discrimination.74
Like the plaintiffs initial burden under Title VII, the prima facie
burden of production is low for a plaintiff alleging direct discrimination
under the SDA. As British courts have explained, "Where there has been
established an act of discrimination, and where it has been established
that one party to the act of discrimination is female and the other male,
prima facie that raises a case which calls for an answer., 75 The 2001
Regulations modify the SDA and statutorily define the plaintiffs prima
facie burden: "It is for the applicant who complains of sex
discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which
the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation,
that the [employer has] committed an act" of unlawful discrimination.76
Although the prima facie burdens for sex discrimination claims in
the U.S. and the U.K. are similar, British and American courts treat such
claims quite differently after the plaintiffs prima facie burden has been
met. The subsequent burdens of proof differ significantly. As discussed
below, because of these differences, the U.S. system is considerably
more employer-friendly than the plaintiff-friendly system that continues
to evolve in the U.K. as highlighted by the 2001 Regulations.
2. The Title VII "Hot Potato": Shifting the Burden from Plaintiff
to Defendant to Plaintiff.
Under a Title VII individual disparate treatment claim, once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, her work is not finished. The
burden first shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment decision.77 However, if the
employer discharges that burden, the plaintiff is once again in the
spotlight and to succeed must demonstrate that the employer's reason
given for the discrimination was either pretextual or discriminatory in its
72. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
73. See, e.g., Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah, [1980] Q.B. 87. However, this
distinction between U.S. and U.K. law may be largely theoretical, given that U.S. law
permits wide inferences about intent based on the end result of how employees are
treated. See infra note 65.
74. Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah, [1980] Q.B. 87.
75. Wallace v. S. E. Educ. and Library Bd., [1980] I.R.L.R. 193.
76. S.I. 2001/2660 § 5.
77. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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application.7 8
a. The employer's burden of production
The employer's burden in a Title VII case is not as high as it is in
Equal Pay Act cases. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,79 a female accounting clerk sued under Title VII alleging sex
discrimination when, as part of a reorganization, her employer failed to
promote her and eventually terminated her, while male employees
remained employed and in some cases were promoted. 80 After a bench
trial, the district court accepted the employer's explanation that the
plaintiff, along with two other employees, was terminated after a
nondiscriminatory evaluation of their relative qualifications and because
they did not work well together.
81
Reversing in part, the Fifth Circuit held that the employer had not
met its burden of successfully rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie case.82
The Fifth Circuit affirmed its previously announced standard that not
only must a defendant prove by objective evidence the existence of
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment action, but it
also must prove that those hired or promoted were better qualified than
the plaintiff.83 The court found that here, the employer satisfied neither
of those elements.84
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's standard.
Instead, the Court held that when an employer is rebutting the plaintiffs
prima facie case, it need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the non-discriminatory reasons it offered.85 Rather, the
employer's evidence need only raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
it discriminated against the plaintiff.86 To satisfy this "intermediate"
burden, the employer must clearly set forth the reasons for its action, and
the explanation must be "legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. 8 7 However, the employer need not do more than produce
admissible evidence that would allow the trier of fact to rationally
conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by
discriminatory animus.88 In other words, the employer need not actually
78. Id. at 806.
79. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
80. Id. at 250-51.
81. Id. at251.
82. Id. at 252.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
86. Id. at 254.
87. Id. at 255, 258.
88. Id. at 257.
[Vol. 24:4
2006] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 879
persuade the factfinder that the employment action was unlawful. 9
The Court stated that the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Burdine had
"misconstrued" the defendant's burden and instead had improperly
placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant. 90  The Court
emphasized that the employer's burden is only one of production, while
the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff.9' The Court
was concerned that the lower court's high burden on employers could be
read as requiring an employer to hire a minority or female applicant
whenever that person's objective qualifications are equal to those of a
white male applicant.92  However, the Court noted, Title VII in fact
permits an employer the discretion to choose among equally qualified
candidates provided the decision is not based on unlawful criteria.93
In addition to articulating a non-discriminatory reason for the
employment decision, Title VII provides several statutory defenses for
employers accused of sex discrimination. 94  The most relevant is the
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense, which allows an
89. Id. The Burdine Court recognized that although as a defendant the employer is
not required to persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was ultimately
lawful, it nevertheless retains an incentive to do so, and thus the employer will normally
attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Id. at 258. However, the employer
need only offer enough of a rebuttal to cancel out the plaintiffs prima facie evidence.
Since the plaintiffs initial burden of putting on a prima facie case is relatively low, the
employer's burden is correspondingly low, and if the employer meets its burden, the
presumption raised by the plaintiff "drops from the case.... A satisfactory explanation
by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from
the plaintiff's initial evidence." Id. at 255 n.10. See also Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll.
v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) ("[T]he employer's burden is satisfied if [it] simply
,explains what [it] has done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons.").
90. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57.
91. Id. at 254-55.
92. Id. at 259.
93. Id.
94. These include, for example, exemptions from Title VII for Communist Party
members, national security exceptions, and exceptions for seniority or merit systems. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f)-(h) (2006). Earlier in Title VII's history, an employer had also been
able to avoid a finding of liability under Title VII by invoking a "same decision" defense.
That is, even if an illegal reason was a partial motivator behind the employment decision,
if the employer could persuade the factfinder that it would have made the same decision
for legitimate reasons absent the illegal reason (i.e., poor job performance), it did not
violate Title VII. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). However, this
outcome was eliminated with the 1991 amendments to Title VII. Now an employer
cannot avoid liability with the same decision defense, but the defense may be relevant in
limiting the plaintiff's remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) ("[A]n unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice" (emphasis added)). The
1991 amendments also authorized the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in
addition to injunctive relief and back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (2006).
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employer to discriminate on the basis of sex in those instances where sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the business or enterprise.95 In a broad interpretation
of this defense, the Supreme Court has held that state regulations barring
women from working as guards in a male prison do not violate Title VII
under the BFOQ exception.96 Generally, however, the BFOQ exception
has been interpreted very narrowly in accordance with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines because labeling jobs
as "men's" or "women's" jobs tends to deny employment opportunities
necessarily to one sex or the other.
97
b. The plaintiff's burden of persuasion
Once the employer has satisfied its relatively low burden of
production rebutting the employee's prima facie case, the plaintiff retains
the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that illegal discrimination
motivated the employer's decision.98 To prevail, the plaintiff must
persuade the court that the employer's proffered reason for the
employment decision was pretextual or discriminatory in its
application.99
i. Pretext-Plus
Courts have wrestled with the nature of the plaintiffs burden of
persuasion at this stage of litigation. In the 1990s, in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 00 the Supreme Court hinted at a high bar for plaintiffs
by rejecting the idea that a plaintiff should always win simply by
showing the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. In this race
discrimination case, an African-American correctional officer who had
enjoyed a satisfactory employment record under a prior supervisor was
terminated after conflicts with a new supervisor and subsequent
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
96. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The Dothard Court felt that the
BFOQ exception was justified because of the fact that sex offenders were scattered
throughout the prison system, the inmates were deprived of a "normal heterosexual
environment," and "the employee's very womanhood" would "undermine her capacity to
provide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Id. at
336.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2006).
98. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
99. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). There, the
Court emphasized how important this burden is to plaintiffs. When remanding the case
back to the district court to give the plaintiff the chance to show employer pretext, the
Court instructed that in the absence of a finding of pretext or discriminatory application,
the employer's action "must stand." Id. at 806.
100. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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degradation of his work history. 0 1 After a bench trial, the district court
found that the reasons the employer gave for the demotion and discharge
were not the "real" reasons. 0 2  Nevertheless, it also found that the
employer had sustained its burden of production by introducing
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, specifically, that
the employee had violated numerous rules. 103 Because the employee did
not adequately rebut those reasons, the trial court entered judgment in the
employer's favor.
10 4
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that once an employee proves
all of the employer's proffered reasons for the employment action to be
pretextual, the employee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 10 5
Because all of the employer's reasons were discredited, the court held
that the employer had offered no legitimate reasons for its actions and
was in no better a position than it would have been had it remained silent
and not offered any rebuttal to the plaintiffs prima facie case, thus
compelling judgment for the employee. 10 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding that once
an employee proves that all of the employer's proffered reasons for the
employment action are pretextual, the employee is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.' 07 Instead, the Court emphasized the high hurdle for
the plaintiff by tying her burden at this stage to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 0 8 The plaintiff still bears the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the discriminatory action was because of sex.' 09 To hold
otherwise, the Court said, would go against the Court's "repeated
admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the 'ultimate
burden of persuasion." '"I 10 This ultimate burden requires a showing both
that the employer's proffered reason was false, and that discrimination
was the real motivator."' The standard a court must use in finding
illegal discrimination is not that the employer's explanation of its action
is not believable, but rather that the employer's action was the product of
101. Id. at 504.
102. Id. at 508.
103. Id. at 507.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 508-09.
106. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1993).
107. Id. at 509.
108. Id. at 507, citing Fed. R. Evid. 301 (2005) ("[A] presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
risk or nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast.").
109. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507.
110. Id.at51l.
11. Id. at515.
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unlawful discrimination.1 1 2
ii. Pretext Only
St. Mary's Honor Center sharply divided the Court: the decision
was five to four. The dissenters criticized the majority's holding,
describing it as saying that once a plaintiff succeeds in showing an
employer's proffered reasons are pretextual, the factfinder may still
proceed to "roam the record, searching for some nondiscriminatory
explanation that the defendant has not raised and that the plaintiff has
had no fair opportunity to disprove." ' 1 3 The Court visited the issue again
in 2000 in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,1 4 after a split
developed in the circuits post-St. Mary's Honor Center over the evidence
a plaintiff must present, beyond a showing that the employer's proffered
reasons were pretextual, to be successful.1 5
In Sanderson Plumbing Products, a jury found that the plaintiff was
illegally terminated because his employer had willfully discriminated
against him based on his age.1 16 However, adopting the view of some
other federal circuits based on their reading of St. Mary's Honor Center,
the Fifth Circuit reversed.' 17 Although the court acknowledged that the
employee "very well may" have offered sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find the employer's explanation for its employment
decision was pretextual, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not
introduced sufficient additional evidence to satisfy his burden to
convince a rational jury that he had been discharged because of his
age. 18 The court therefore reversed the district court's judgment in favor
of the employer.1 9
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, because it had
"misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs" once an
employer proffers its reason for the action it took.' 20 The Court clarified
that in St. Mary's Honor Center, it had reasoned that it is permissible for
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity
112. Id. at 514.
113. Id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). This case was an age discrimination case brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). The
Court assumed that ADEA cases share the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
paradigm as do Title VII cases. Id. at 142.
115. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. at 140.
116. Id. at 139.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 139-40.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 146.
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of the employer's explanation. 121 The Court noted that such an inference
is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder
is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as
"affirmative evidence of guilt."'1 22 Although showing that an employer's
proffered reasons are pretextual may not always be adequate to sustain a
jury's ultimate finding of liability, the Court concluded, it is sufficient to
permit the case to proceed to the factfinder. 123 The factfinder can then
draw inferences where appropriate and make a decision based on all the
evidence. 124 The Sanderson Plumbing Products standard remains the
law today.
3. Post-Prima Facie Burdens under the Sex Discrimination Act.
Shifting the burden of production to the defendant in U.K. sex
discrimination cases will be recognizable to those familiar with the U.S.
system. Once the plaintiff has established her prima facie case, British
employers, like their American counterparts, have the burden of showing
their actions were not due to the sex of the employee. However, as
highlighted by the 2001 Regulations, a British employer's burden is a
very high one indeed, and as will be explored, a plaintiff's post-prima
facie burden is now almost nonexistent. This stands in sharp contrast to
the U.S. where, despite the Supreme Court's apparent easing of the St.
Mary's Honor Center rule with Sanderson Plumbing Products, the
burden explicitly shifts back to the plaintiff after the employer gives its
explanation.
a. Employer's burden prior to the 2001 Regulations
As early as 1981, shifting the burden from the plaintiff to the
employer in discrimination cases began to develop in British case law.
Initially, the burden on the employer was fairly high. In Khanna v.
Ministry of Defence,125 the employment appeal tribunal (EAT) held that
the efficient way to deal with discrimination cases would be for the
tribunal to look at the evidence as a whole and "simply decide[] whether
the complaint has been established., 126  If a prima facie case was
established and less favorable treatment proven, the employer would be
called upon to explain. 127 Failing a "clear and specific" explanation, the
121. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 at 147 (2000).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 148.
124. Id.
125. [1981] I.C.R. 653.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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tribunal would infer unlawful discrimination and the complaint would
succeed. 
128
However, courts later eased the burden on the employer. The court
of appeal in King v. The Great Britain-China Centre'29 exemplified the
change. In Great Britain-China Centre, a race discrimination case, a
Chinese woman educated in Britain applied for a job at the Centre, a
government sponsored organization created to promote cultural and
social ties between the people of Great Britain and China.130 The job
description included the requirements that applicants have "[f]irst-hand"
knowledge of China and be fluent in Chinese, which the plaintiff met.13'
However, the Chinese plaintiff was not offered an interview while all the
candidates who were offered an interview, including the ultimately
successful candidate, were white.1
32
The industrial tribunal upheld the complaint. 33 It noted that no
ethnically Chinese person had ever been employed at the Centre, nor had
any of the five Chinese candidates for this position made it to a short list
to be considered for the job. 134  Therefore, the tribunal concluded,
because the employer did not demonstrate that the plaintiff had not been
treated unfavorably, or that the unfavorable treatment was not because of
her race, it was entitled to draw the conclusion that the plaintiff had been
discriminated against because of her race. 35 The case proceeded to an
appeal, where the employer argued that the lower tribunal had placed too
high a burden on it to disprove the discrimination.
136
While the court of appeal agreed with the industrial tribunal in this
case, it clarified that the evidentiary burden of proof to prove
discrimination should not be fully shifted to the employer as a matter of
law. 137  In fact, the court called such an attempt "unnecessary and
unhelpful."'' 38 The court was clear that a plaintiff is still required to make
out a prima facie case using a balance of the probabilities standard.
139
However, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case showing
possible illegal discrimination, the tribunal is then entitled to look to the
128. Id. This plaintiff-friendly view was adopted by the court of appeal in Baker v.
Cornwall County Council, [1990] I.R.L.R. 194.
129. [1992] I.C.R. 516.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. King v. The Great Britain-China Centre, [1992] I.C.R. 516.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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employer for an explanation. 140 If no explanation is given, or if the
tribunal considers the explanation to be inadequate or unsatisfactory, "it
will be legitimate for the tribunal to infer" illegal discrimination, "not
[as] a matter of law, but... almost common sense."'14 1
In addition to successfully rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie case,
British employers have a statutory defense available to them under the
SDA called the "genuine occupational qualification" exception. 142 The
defense is similar to the bona fide occupational qualification defense
available to American employers, and applies "where being a man is a
genuine occupational qualification for the job.' 43 This can occur where
"the essential nature of the job calls for a man for reasons of physiology
(excluding physical strength or stamina)" or where "the job needs to be
held by a man to preserve decency or privacy" because it might involve
physical contact or a state of undress or "using sanitary facilities."' 44 An
employer successfully asserting this defense can escape liability.
b. The 2001 Burden of Proof Regulations
The 2001 Regulations added a new section to the SDA that instructs
employment tribunals on how to handle sex discrimination complaints.
The codified law now requires that once a plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case of sex discrimination, "in the absence of an adequate
explanation from the [employer].... the tribunal shall uphold the
complaint unless the [employer] proves that he did not commit, or ... is
not to be treated as having committed, that act.' 45
The new Regulations appear to relieve the plaintiff of the ultimate
burden of persuasion and to embody much of the Khanna standard,
giving plaintiffs more ammunition than they had after Great Britain-
China Centre. This was evident in the first major case addressing the
changes, Barton v. Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd.146
Barton involved a female investment banker and fund manager who
received a smaller bonus and fewer share options than did a male
counterpart. 47 The tribunal accepted the employer's explanation for its
decision to reward the male employee more, and excused any unfair
140. Id.
141. King v. The Great Britain-China Centre, [1992] I.C.R. 516. The House of Lords
ultimately adopted the Great Britain-China Centre view in Glasgow City Council v.
Zafar, [1997] W.L.R. 1659.
142. SDA § 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 2001 Regulations § 5, creating SDA § 63A (emphasis added).
146. [2003] I.C.R. 1205.
147. Id. at 5-7.
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results of the bonus as being an innocent byproduct of the financial
industry employment culture.1 48  The tribunal also found that the
employer had made out a successful defense because of its concern about
the male employee being head-hunted by other firms, and because the
employer felt that the male employee was important to the company's
success. 149 Barton appealed, citing the misapplication of the new 2001
Regulations as one source of error.'50
On appeal, the employment appeal tribunal set out new guidance in
light of the 2001 Regulations. The EAT made clear that what has not
changed in direct discrimination cases is the requirement that the plaintiff
make out a prima facie case that satisfies the balance of probabilities
standard or the complaint will fail.' 5' However, if that standard is
satisfied, and if the plaintiff has shown facts from which inferences
"could" be drawn,' 52 the burden shifts to the defendant who then must
prove that it either did not commit, or is not to be treated as having
committed, that act. 153  To discharge that burden, the employer must
prove by a balance of the probabilities standard that the treatment was
not at all based on sex, since "no discrimination whatsoever" is what is
required by the European law upon which the 2001 Regulations are
based.
15 4
Further, the EAT elaborated that the discharge of the employer's
burden is a burden of persuasion rather than merely a burden of
148. Id. at 8. It was undisputed that the bonus scheme was a murky one. The
tribunal found that the scheme was "a rough and ready exercise, not a precise science,"
and that it was both a "cultural reason" and a "vital component of the City bonus culture
that bonuses [were] discretionary, [with] scheme rules . . . unwritten and individuals'
bonuses.., not revealed." Id. Were it not set up that way, the bonus system would
"collapse." Id. The tribunal therefore accepted the employer's unwillingness to disclose
bonuses until compelled by law to do so as part of that culture, and did not draw any
negative inferences from that behavior. Id. at 10.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Id. at 11.
151. Id.at 25(l)-(2).
152. Barton v. Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Ltd., [2003] I.C.R. 1205 at 25(8).
The EAT emphasized the word "could" in the 2001 Regulations which requires that the
plaintiff must "prove facts from which the tribunal could... conclude [unlawful
discrimination] in the absence of an adequate explanation." 2001 Regulations § 5, adding
§ 63A(2) to the SDA. The EAT elaborated:
It is important to note the word could. At [the prima facie] stage the Tribunal
does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead to
the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a
Tribunal is looking at the primary facts provided by the [employee] to see what
inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them.
Barton, [2003] I.C.R. 1205 at 25(5).
153. Barton, [2003] I.C.R. 1205 at 25(8)-( 9).
154. Id. at 25(10). Here the EAT is referring to language in the European Council
Burden of Proof Directive, E.C. Directive 97/80 (1997), which the EAT quotes directly.
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production:
[A] Tribunal [must] assess not merely whether the [employer] has
proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can
be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of
proof on the balance of probabilities that sex was not any part of the
reasons for the treatment in question .... Since the facts necessary to
prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the
[employer], a Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to
discharge that burden of proof.
155
The EAT remitted the case to a fresh tribunal to reconsider the matter in
light of the EAT's guidelines with regard to the 2001 Regulations.156
Employment tribunals are still adjusting to the 2001 Regulations
and the guidance set forth in Barton. For example, in Cunningham v.
Quedos Ltd.,1 an employment tribunal failed to shift the burden to the
employer as required under the new law. In Cunningham, a woman
applied for the position of a pharmaceutical sales representative at
Wyeth, a pharmaceutical company.158 Cunningham had been employed
in the same capacity with employer Quedos, an independent contractor
for Wyeth, and had been working on the Wyeth contract when Wyeth
decided to bring the work in-house. 59 People at both Quedos and Wyeth
were familiar with Cunningham's work. 60 Quedos recommended her to
Wyeth as a good addition to their newly-forming in-house sales team,
and she was led to believe she was very competitive for the new
position.'16  Six days after she was informed she would be interviewed
for the position with Wyeth, she told people at both Quedos and Wyeth
that she was pregnant. 62 Two weeks later, without explanation she was
told her application with Wyeth would be taken no further and she would
not be interviewed for the position.' 63 After she questioned the reasons
behind the decision, she was terminated by Quedos.164  Wyeth,
apparently fearing legal action, ultimately went through with an
interview, but did not hire her.' 65 Cunningham filed a complaint against
155. Barton, [2003] I.C.R. 1205 at 25(11)-(12).
156. Id. at 33. The EAT observed that in this case there appeared to be an
"abundance" of evidence from which the lower tribunal should have drawn inferences of
discrimination and shifted the burden to the employer. Id. at 32.
157. E.A.T./0298/03 (U.K. 2003).
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 11-13.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 15.
163. Id.
164. Cunningham v. Quedos, E.A.T./0298/03 at 16-17 (U.K. 2003).
165. Id.
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both Quedos and Wyeth. 166
Despite a clear prima facie case, the tribunal accepted the
employer's explanation that there was no bias involved in the decision,
and that the reason Cunningham was not hired was because other
candidates were better qualified. 167 The tribunal said:
She was not selected solely because, on the [interview] day, her
performance... did not sufficiently impress her interviewers. It had
nothing to do with her pregnancy. The question of drawing an
inference, of sex discrimination or otherwise, does not therefore arise.
The [employer] did not treat the Applicant less favourably by reason
of her sex, and her claim for sex discrimination against them
therefore fails.168
Cunningham appealed. She argued that since she had established a
prima facie case, the tribunal should have made the inference of sex
discrimination and the burden of persuasion should have shifted to
Wyeth to prove that it did not act discriminatorily.1 69 Therefore, she
argued, the tribunal failed to hold Wyeth to the higher standard of
persuasion now required by the 2001 Regulations and Barton.170
The employment appeal tribunal agreed. Because the tribunal heard
Cunningham's case on January 20, 2003,171 but the Barton decision was
not issued until March 6, 2003, the EAT realized that "[t]here is no
indication that [the tribunal] clearly understood, as Tribunals now with
the benefit of Barton will understand, how the mechanics of the new
burden will be worked through.' 72 Extensively citing Barton, the EAT
concluded that Cunningham had in fact made out a prima facie case, and
therefore the tribunal should require the employer to prove that
discrimination was not the reason for Cunningham's treatment. 1 73 The
case was remanded to a new tribunal with instructions to apply the
Barton guidelines. 174
B. Disparate Impact and Indirect Discrimination
Even if is undisputed that the employer was not actually motivated
by illegal discrimination, did not intend to discriminate, and did not treat
an individual woman less favorably than a man, an employer can still run
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 12(4).
168. Id. at 19(22) (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 29-31.
170. Cunningham v. Quedos, E.A.T./0298/03 at 21, 29-31 (U.K. 2003).
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 44.
173. Id. at 48.
174. Id. at 49-51.
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afoul of both American and British law if its practices have a negative
impact on one group more than another. This concept originated in the
U.S. courts where it is known as disparate impact. 175 A similar concept
has evolved in the U.K. where it is known as indirect discrimination.
1. Development in the U.S.
The Supreme Court articulated the concept of disparate impact early
in Title VII's history in the landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 176
In Griggs, a power generating facility implemented a policy of requiring
a high school diploma or successful completion of a standardized written
test before employees would be permitted to work in certain positions
within the facility. 177 At that time in North Carolina, where the facility
was located, 34% of white males had completed high school but only
12% of black males had done so. 178 In addition, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission had found that use of standardized tests
including those used here resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests,
compared to only 6% of blacks. 179 There was no dispute that neither the
diploma nor the test requirements were intended to measure the ability to
learn to perform any specific jobs, 180 or had any demonstrable
relationship to the actual successful performance of the jobs for which
they were prerequisites.181
The district court found that although the employer previously had
followed a policy of overt racial discrimination, Title VII was not
violated because it no longer did so. 182 The court of appeals agreed,
holding that a subjective test of the employer's intent should govern and
that because no discriminatory purpose behind the diploma and test
requirements had been shown, there was no violation of Title VII. 83
175. "Disparate impact" is defined as the adverse effect of a facially neutral practice
that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national origin,
age, or disability that is not justified by business necessity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
483 (7th ed. 1999). This is different from systemic disparate treatment, which consists of
employment practices which discriminate against groups of people but still requires
intent or motive on the part of the employer to discriminate. See, e.g., Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
176. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
177. Id. at 427-28.
178. Id. at 430 n.6.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 428.
181. Id. at 431. A vice president of the company testified that the tests were
implemented based on the employer's judgment that the new requirements "generally
would improve the overall quality of the work force." Id.
182. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971).
183. Id. However, the court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that Title
VII was intended to be prospective only and consequently the impact of prior inequities
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Because there was no showing of "racial purpose or invidious intent,"
and because the requirements were applied to whites and blacks alike,
the court of appeals held that the requirements should be permitted.
184
The court specifically rejected the claim that because the requirements
resulted in a "markedly disproportionate" number of blacks being
ineligible for the positions, they were unlawful under Title VII unless
shown to be job related.1 85
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because whites fared far
better under the employer's requirements than blacks for reasons that
could be traced directly to race.' 86  The Court reasoned that because
Congress attempted to eliminate race-based preferences by enacting Title
VII, the legislation mandates the removal of "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers" when such barriers have the effect of
discriminating on the basis of race or other impermissible
classifications. 187  The Court specifically held that "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent" does not redeem such employment
procedures, and that Congress "directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.'
' 88
Therefore, the employer has the burden of showing that any requirement
which ends up having a disparate impact on one group has a "manifest
relationship" to the employment in question and is borne of a "business
necessity."'189  Otherwise, the practice is prohibited. 90  Although the
employer in Griggs pointed to language in Title VII specifically
permitting the use of general intelligence tests, 191 the Court found that the
employer did not meet its burden of showing that the test was "predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior"
for the jobs for which the tests were required. 192
In 1991, amendments were made to Title VII which essentially
codified the Griggs standards and the disparate impact concept. 193 The
was beyond the reach of the act. Id. at 429.
184. Id. at 429.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 430. The Court recognized that the results were different by race because
African Americans had "long received inferior education in segregated schools." Id.
187. Id. at431.
188. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 431.
190. Id.
191. "[It shall not be] an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test ... is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
192. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9, quoting EEOC guidelines.
193. The 1991 amendments read:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established. ..
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1991 amendments also permit plaintiffs to prevail even if an employer
can show a business necessity for the practice if the plaintiff can show an
"alternative employment practice."' 94  To show an alternative
employment practice, the plaintiff must demonstrate that an acceptable
and less discriminatory alternative exists, and that the employer refused
to adopt it.1
95
2. Development in the U.K.
The Griggs disparate impact analysis soon crossed the Atlantic., 96
The concept was codified in the SDA, which stipulates that such
"indirect discrimination" occurs when an employer applies a
"requirement or condition" to a woman that is also applied to a man, but
which is such that "the proportion of women who can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with
it."'197 If the employer cannot show that the requirement or condition is
"justifiable," and if it "is to [the employee's] detriment because she
cannot comply with it[,]" the SDA has been violated.' 98
Under the SDA, the impact of an employer's specific "requirement
or condition" is scrutinized, rather than the more general "employment
practice" or procedures of an employer in the U.S. 199 A plaintiff in the
U.K. need only show that she cannot actually comply with the
if a complaining party demonstrates that [an employer] uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). The 1991 amendments also explicitly state that
the business necessity defense may not be used against a claim of intentional
discrimination (i.e., disparate treatment). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2006). Recently
the Supreme Court clarified that plaintiffs can also bring disparate impact claims based
on age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (2005). Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (2005).
195. Id.
196. British courts and parties became familiar with U.S. case law on the issue. See,
e.g., Jenkins v. Kingsgate, [ 1981 ] W.L.R. 927 (discussing a plaintiff in the U.K. referring
to the disparate impact "principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." and noting that the principle of "adverse impact" as noted
by Griggs is the same as in § l(1)(b) of the SDA).
197. SDA § l(1)(b). The language is nearly identical in the Race Relations Act,
§ 1 (1)(b), except the Race Relations Act refers to "racial groups" instead of "women."
198. Id.
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006). However, even in the U.S., a
plaintiff must be able to point to discrete "particular" employment practices instead of
simply the end result of a disparity in the numbers of employees from a particular group
being impacted, unless the particular practices cannot be separated. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
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requirement or condition; the existence of another woman who may be
able to comply is immaterial. For example, in Price v. Civil Service
Commission,20 0 a female clerk applied for a position as an executive
officer.20  The position required that applicants be between the ages of
seventeen-and-a-half and twenty-eight, a requirement with which the
applicant could not comply. 20 2 She filed suit under the SDA, alleging
indirect sex discrimination on the grounds that women have greater
difficulty complying with such a requirement than men because many
more women than men in that age group have child care
203responsibilities. Therefore, women would be less likely to apply for a
position with that requirement because by the time they no longer had
child care responsibilities, they would be too old. 04
The employment tribunal dismissed the case, narrowly construing
the "can comply" wording of the Act when it held that it is possible for
women to comply with the requirement if they do not have children.2 °5
The EAT rejected this reasoning, holding that just because a woman
"can" theoretically comply with the Act, such a construction would be
"wholly out of sympathy with the spirit and intent" of the Act. 206
Instead, the EAT held that whether a person can comply should be
evaluated in terms of whether a specific plaintiff can actually do so. 207
According to the Act, the employer's burden is to show that the
requirement or condition is "justifiable irrespective of the sex of the
person to whom it is applied., 20 8 An early articulation of the employer's
burden was made in Steel v. Union of Post Office Workers.2 °9 In that
case, a female postal worker alleged sex discrimination because of a
seniority system that prevented her from receiving a promotion, but
allowed a male employee who had been employed for less time to be
promoted.210 The EAT overturned the industrial tribunal's dismissal of
200. [1977] W.L.R. 1417.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. The employer submitted evidence that more women than men had applied to
and been hired in such positions, offering that as proof that the requirements did not
unduly burden women. Id.
206. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, [1977] W.L.R. 1417.
207. Id. The case was ultimately remanded to a differently constituted tribunal for
further proceedings. Id.
208. SDA § (1)(b)(ii).
209. [1978] W.L.R. 64.
210. Id. Prior to the SDA being implemented in 1975, only men could be
"permanent" employees with this employer, while women were limited to being
"temporary" employees. Id. After the implementation of the SDA, women could attain
permanent status, but their seniority in that status was measured from the time they
attained that status. Id. No credit was given for previous time worked for the employer
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the case on a technicality, 21I and remanded it for further proceedings with
instructions that the plaintiff should succeed unless the employer could
satisfy its "heavy onus [of proof]. 212 In deciding whether the employer
had discharged its burden, the EAT directed the tribunal to:
[T]ake into account all the circumstances, including the
discriminatory effect of the requirement or condition if it is permitted
to continue.... [Also,] it is necessary to weigh the need for the
requirement or condition against that effect. [Finally,] it is right to
distinguish between a requirement or condition which is necessary,
and one which is merely convenient, and for this purpose it is
relevant to consider whether the employer can find some other and
non-discriminatory method of achieving his object.2 13
The employer's burden was eased somewhat in Ojutiku and
Oburoni v. Manpower Services Commission,214 where the court of appeal
specifically criticized the Steel court for suggesting "justifiable" rose
almost to the level of "necessity.' 21 5 In rejecting what was essentially
the business necessity standard articulated in Steel, Lord Justice
Everleigh found that "justifiable" does not mean the employer has to
show that the requirement or condition is necessary for the good of the
business.216  Rather, an employer has justified its conduct merely by
as a temporary employee. Id. The plaintiff had actually been employed by the post
office since 1961. Id. She had applied for a different mail delivery route in 1976, but
routes were awarded by seniority based on permanent status. Id. The route was therefore
awarded to a man who had only been employed by the post office since 1973, but who
had been on permanent status that entire time, and so was technically more senior under
the rules. Id.
In this regard the case is similar to Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188
(1974), see infra note 33, which the EAT in Steel notes at n.2. Both involved systems of
separate work classifications for women and men that originated before such
classifications became illegal, and both involved union-negotiated collective bargaining
agreements that had the practical effect of perpetuating the effects of past discrimination
even after the different classifications were abolished.
211. The employee's complaint was actually directed not at her employer but at her
union, whom she faulted for negotiating seniority provisions that did not credit women
who were employees before receiving permanent status in 1975 with any time worked
before then. Steel, [1978] W.L.R. 64. Nevertheless, the EAT found the employer liable
for violating the SDA. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. The very last bit echoes the "alternative employment practice" concept in
Title VII discussed infra note 193.
214. [1982] I.C.R. 661. Ojutiku was a race discrimination case but the relevant
language concerning the employer's "justification" for the requirement or condition
found in the Race Relations Act is identical to that in the SDA: the employer must show
the requirement or condition "to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality
or ethnic or national origins of the person to which it is applied." Race Relations Act
§ 1 (1)(b)(ii).
215. Ojutiku, [1982] I.C.R. 661.
216. Id.
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showing that the conduct "would be acceptable to right-thinking people
as sound and tolerable reasons for so doing.,
217
3. The 2001 and 2005 Regulations on Indirect Discrimination.
The 2001 Regulations do not change the "justifiable" language
modifying the employer's burden in indirect discrimination claims.
Rather, they make three changes that ease the plaintiffs burden. First,
an employer now has to be concerned about any broad "provision,
criterion, or practice" it may have instead of a specific "requirement or
condition., 218 Second, rather than a specific woman not being able to
comply with the "provision, criterion, or practice," it only has to be "to
the detriment of a considerably larger proportion of women than of
men."2 19 Finally, instead of the "provision, criterion, or practice" having
to be "to her detriment because she cannot comply with it," it merely has
to be "to her detriment.,
220
Although the new definition of indirect discrimination does not
explicitly change the employer's obligation to justify a discriminatory
employment practice, it would seem to make the plaintiff's job easier.
Some commentators have observed that the new definition not only
refers to a wider "provision, criterion, or practice" instead of a
requirement or condition to which a plaintiff can object, but also that the
plaintiff no longer has to prove that she cannot comply with such a
practice-it is now enough that she show complying would be to her
vague "detriment., 221 In addition, the change from the showing that a
"considerably smaller.., proportion" of women than men can comply to
the showing that the practice must be "to the detriment of a larger
proportion of women than men" may lead to controversy over how
statistics are gathered and presented in sex discrimination cases.
222
Finally, combined with other changes to the SDA that require an
employment tribunal to "uphold the complaint unless the [employer]
proves that he did not commit" unlawful sex discrimination, discussed
previously, the burden has shifted more firmly from being primarily on
the plaintiff to prove workplace discrimination to being primarily on the
employer to prove that it did not discriminate.223
217. Id.
218. S.I. 2001/2660 § 3, modifying original SDA § l(1)(b) and creating new SDA
§ 1(2)(b).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Paul Epstein, Changes in the law of sex discrimination, NEW LAW JOURNAL,
Dec. 21, 2001.
222. Id.
223. See Patrick Tracey, UK. Rules on Preventing Sex Discrimination Shift Burden
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Further, although the 2001 Regulations are technically amendments
to the SDA, courts are applying the principles to the Equal Pay Act as
well. For example, in Nelson v. Carillion Services Ltd.,224 a female
employee of a company that performed service work in a hospital alleged
unlawful sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act because she was
paid less than a man doing the same work.225 The employment tribunal
dismissed her claim, and the EAT affirmed. 6 She then appealed on the
grounds that the tribunals erred by putting the burden of proof on her to
establish her case of indirect discrimination, arguing that once she
credibly raised such a case, the burden was then for the employer to
disprove it.
2 2 7
After a discussion about burdens of proof under the Equal Pay Act,
the court moved into a discussion of the 2001 Regulations. 228  Even
though this claim was initially brought under the Equal Pay Act, the
court felt that there was "every reason" for approaching the burden of
proof in indirect discrimination cases the same way irrespective of which
legislative scheme the claim was brought under.229 This case shows that
British courts are not afraid to interpret the 2001 Regulations broadly.
On October 1, 2005, the definition of indirect discrimination under
the SDA was again changed. 230  This latest revision was designed to
bring U.K. law into full compliance with the 2002 Equal Treatment
Directive issued by European Union legislation. 231 The primary change
from Employee to Employer, 198 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-8, Oct. 16, 2001.
224. [2003] I.C.R. 1256.
225. Id. at 7 4-7.
226. Id. at 1.
227. Id. at 18. The court of appeal noted that this argument was not advanced
before the EAT; nevertheless, the court went on to entertain it. Id.
228. Id. at 21-31.
229. Id. at 32, citing Strathclyde Reg'l Council v. Wallace, [1998] I.C.R. 205, 212.
Unfortunately for Ms. Wallace, the court of appeal ultimately decided against her, finding
that she "plainly failed" to even establish a prima facie case, so the question of whether
the employer discharged its burden under the 2001 Regulations was not reached. Nelson,
[2003] I.C.R. 1256 at 39. Despite the court's willingness to entertain the idea that the
2001 Regulations concerning employer burdens of proof could apply to Equal Pay Act
claims, it was not willing to entertain the idea that the plaintiffs burden of establishing a
prima facie case should be lowered. The plaintiff submitted the idea that the burden
throughout an Equal Pay Act claim should be on the employer, with the employee only
having to advance no more than a "credible suggestion," id. at 28, or a "positive
averment," id. at 32, of disproportionate adverse impact. The court rejected both of
those proposed standards. Id. at 30.
230. The Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005, S.I.
2005/2467. These Regulations also provide a statutory definition of harassment for SDA
purposes.
231. U.K. Gov'T DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY'S WOMEN AND EQUALITY UNIT,
UPDATING THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 1-4 (2005),
available at http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/publications/consultation.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2006).
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to the definition of indirect discrimination is that instead of a provision,
criterion or practice having to be "to the detriment of a considerably
larger portion of women than of men," it must "put[] or would put
women at a particular disadvantage when compared to men.,
232
However, because U.K. sex discrimination legislation already meets
most of the E.U.'s requirements, the government expects the practical
changes arising from the 2005 Regulations to be minimal for private
employers.233
V. Conclusion
The historic common law and statutory roots of sex and
employment discrimination legal principles are similar in the U.S. and
the U.K. However, recently the two countries' standards on how
employers can defend themselves from such claims have diverged. An
employee alleging sex discrimination in the workplace who has met her
prima facie burden has a considerably easier case in the U.K. than she
would in the U.S. Even before the 2001 Regulations, a British employer
had a fairly high burden to show the court that sex did not influence the
employment decision. Although the full impact of the 2001 and 2005
Regulations concerning indirect discrimination have yet to be fully
realized, the portion of the Regulations concerning burdens of proof
appear to no longer require a plaintiff to actually prove that
discrimination occurred. In the U.S., on the other hand, the employer
only has a relatively low burden of production that the employee then has
to counter clearly.
Reducing discrimination in the workplace is a noble goal.
However, it may be unwise to disturb certain bedrock principles of law.
One of those is affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probation (the proof is
incumbent on the one who affirms, not on the one who denies).2 34 U.S.
employers and those who represent them may feel that given the right (or
wrong, depending on perspective) judge or jury, defendants bear a
heavier burden than the actual law requires, but at least the theory of the
law is on their side. Easing the plaintiffs ultimate burden and placing a
burden of persuasion on the defendant in the manner mandated by the
2001 Regulations in the U.K. may encourage meritless litigation and put
employers in the difficult and untenable position of having to prove a
negative.
232. S.I. 2005/2467 at 3 (emphasis added).
233. Supra note 231. However, there are more significant changes for public and
religious employers. Supra note 231 at 29-34.
234. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1618 (7th ed. 1999).
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